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Abstract
This article considers the practice of encouraged gazing in Alvin Yapan's An Kubo sa Kawayanan (“The Hut in the Bamboo Grove”)
(2015) as a possible exercise on revering things. As such, it is wagered to be instructive towards a reunderstanding of vision as a form
of material encounter with things beyond their mere objectification. Sense of sight is argued to be a human telepathic ability, that is,
a distance (tele) feeling (pathein) with and for thigns, despite and because of their indeterminate materialities. Through looking closely
at the rhetorical engagements of Yapan's Kubo with its various viewers and critics, the essay attempts to articulate that such telepathic
work can be an instance of enchantment with things, wherein one becomes most permeable to the vitalities of others. At the same time,
this is also deemed as a consequence of one's active practicing of careful atttention to these materialities performing their own vitalities
in the same ecology, no matter how seemingly imperceptible.
Niniejszy artykuł ukazuje zjawisko "intensywnego patrzenia" (encouraged gazing) w filmie Alvina Yapana An Kubo sa Kawayanan
(„Chata w bambusowym gaju”) (2015) jako potencjalne ćwiczenie w oddawaniu czci rzeczom, prowadzące do zrozumienia widzenia jako
formy materialnego spotkania z rzeczami, wykraczającego poza ich zwykłe uprzedmiotowienie. Autor argumentuje, że zmysł wzroku
jest ludzką zdolnością telepatyczną, to znaczy odległym (tele) odczuwaniem (pathein) z rzeczami i dla rzeczy, pomimo i z powodu ich
nieokreślonej materialności. Przyglądając się bliżej retorycznym negocjacjom pomiędzy filmem Yapana a jego widzami i krytykami,
autor zauważa, że tak rozumiana telepatia może być traktowana jako zachwyt nad rzeczami, w którym człowiek współodczuwa ich
witalność. Jest to jednocześnie konsekwencja aktywnego praktykowania uważności wobec przedmiotów i innych form nieożywionych,
które realizują swoje własne życiowe siły w tej samej ekologii, bez względu na to jak niezauważalne się wydają.

Key words
Philippine contemporary cinema, Alvin Yapan, new materialism, telepathy, spectatorship
filipińskie kino współczesne, Alvin Yapan, nowy materializm, telepatia, widzenie

License
This work is licensed under a Creative Commons Attribution 4.0 international (CC BY 4.0). The content of the license
is available at http://creativecommons.org/licenses/by/4.0/

Received: 15 January 2021 | Accepted: 18 April 2021
DOI: https://doi.org/10.29107/rr2021.2.4

Res Rhetorica, ISSN 2392-3113, 8 (2) 2021, p. 55
CHRISTIAN JIL R. BENITEZ
ATENEO DE MANILA UNIVERSITY, THE PHILIPPINES
https://orcid.org/0000-0002-0654-1698
cbenitez@ateneo.edu

Telepathic Visions: On Alvin Yapan’s
An Kubo sa Kawayanan (2015)

1. “Is it possible for a person to fall in love with a house?”
Alvin Yapan’s An Kubo sa Kawayanan (The House by the Bamboo Grove)
(2019) tells the story of Michelle (Mercedes Cabral), a maiden who lives alone
in a bamboo hut, away from the rest of the population in the town of Baao in
Camarines Sur, Philippines. In her solitude, people would often visit her, either
to source bamboo from the grove near her house or to avail her services as the
remaining skilled calado embroider in their town. During such visits, people would
often remark to Michelle that she would be better off finally leaving her hut and
their town, so that just like her mother, she would be able to make a more lucrative
living for herself abroad. This sentiment for departure is concretely personified in
the film through two men: Michelle’s lover Gary (Marc Felix), who initially invites
her to come work overseas with him, only to eventually leave on his own; and the
opportunistic filmmaker named Larry (RK Bagatsing), who features Michelle’s
exquisite embroidery in his documentary, and later on persuades her as well to
move to the city with him, offering her a life where she could possibly showcase
her art to a much larger audience.
For Michelle, however, leaving the bamboo hut is out of question, despite the
possible compromises that the two men graciously laid out to her, such as asking
someone else to look after the house, or finding a new abode altogether. Michelle
firmly resolves to stay in her house because for her, the bamboo hut is not just a mere
shelter, an infrastructure from which she could simply depart anytime she desires;
instead, for her, it is also a being in itself, a matter most vital too in terms of its
own materiality (Bennett 2010, xiii), with which Michelle shares a cherished bond.
As Larry jokingly—and rather uncomfortably—remarks to her later on, Michelle
regards and speaks about the bamboo hut as if it is almost like another person
(“Kung makapagsalita ka, parang tao ’yong pinag-uusapan mo!”). And yet, no
matter how incredulous it may sound to everyone else, this revered materiality of
the bamboo hut is indeed palpable to Michelle, in how it supposedly interacts with
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her in intimate ways. For instance, Michelle says she would sometimes dream of
scenarios that she believes to illustrate, rather poetically, what the house intends
to tell her. Or how, over the course of the film, as more people attempt to persuade
Michelle to leave, portions of the house fall into disrepair, such as the bamboo
flooring by the door squeaking under her feet louder and louder by day, which
Michelle takes to be the hut’s aggressive urging to yield to the people’s convincing.
Prior to this, things also go missing around the house without any apparent reason—
Michelle’s pair of slippers, her mother’s shears, and even the bolo she used in lieu
of her scissors—as if they have all “become the house’s accomplice, deliberately
disappearing to give Michelle a cold shoulder” (Maburaot 2016). All the while,
Michelle simply continues working on her embroidery, insisting against all these
incitements, from both the people and the hut.
Towards the end of the film, as it is already made apparent that there would
be no changing of Michelle’s mind, she poses a rhetorical question to Larry, and,
in turn, to the one beholding the cinematic moment: “Posible bang magmahal
ang isang tao sa isang bahay? O sa isang lugar?” (Is it possible for a person to
fall in love with a house? With a place?)—a question that can be imaginably
extended as to consider other things that are not only nonhuman—say, a beetle
or a bamboo grove—but also those that are not alive, in the most quotidian and
narrow understanding of “life”—say, a pair of scissors or even an empty can of
sardines. Michelle’s question is then followed by the film’s punctuation, which
can be intuited as Yapan’s cinematic protraction of the argument that has just been
proposed: a close-up of a flower floating on the Bicol River eventually drifting to
the sea, the cinematic pursuit of which appears to compel the viewer to meditate
on—if not similarly fall in love with—the vitality of this very matter in sight.
While one might easily respond to Michelle’s question with the same incredulity,
if not outright disapproval expressed by Larry, this essay foremost considers the
possibility of indeed loving a house, a place, and other nonhuman materials;
in other words, the rhetorical question posed by Michelle is hereby wagered as
a foundational argument. Such affirmation can only be conceivable keeping in
mind the most urgent impetus of the so-called “materialist turn” of contemporary
theory, that strives to resist the “perceived neglect or diminishment of matter
[especially] in the dominant Euro-Western tradition” of thought, where matter is
commonly taken as simply “passive substance intrinsically devoid of meaning”
(Gamble, Hanan, and Nail 2019, 111). And so, despite the enduring understanding
of love that has been limited to anthropocentric interrelations (see Ackerman 1994;
Fisher 2017), an alternative is thus presently envisioned: if, as frequently claimed,
love is indeed an art, a “faculty” that one performs (Fromm 1995, 2; see also
Badiou and Truong 2012, 38ff.), then the same technique can also be imaginably
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extended to other forms of matter that might be nonhuman, in order to share with
them an intimate encounter, a “becoming with” that allows one the opportunity
to become in the first place (Haraway 2008, 244). This way, more than anything,
love is proposed to be an “erotic modus operandi” that is “synergetic rather than
repressive” to any material other, which then allows one to become “permeable
to another…. [as to] begin to plumb the other’s unsuspected enormity” (Mathews
2003, 10-11, 19).
It is also in this sense that such love for the material is differentiated from
a merely fetishistic attitude toward it, whose appraisal of things as “mysterious”
primarily hinges on their being commodities, that is, as materials that are always
subjected to terms of anthropocentric pragmatic valuation while keeping the
social chains involved in their laborious productions most hidden (Marx 1990,
164). Indeed, contrary to this attitude, in the presently proposed love for matter,
the human is intuited as possibly willing to be similarly interrupted by the
indeterminable capacity of things to cause even a “strange combination of delight
and disturbance” (Bennett 2010, xi) that can only exceed the aforementioned
anthropocentric valuation. In other words, such love is a way of relating to the
material in which one is permitted every so often “to become shaken by doubt,”
if only “to persist with what [one] can know when [one] can know it” (Butler
2002, 66; emphasis mine; see also Nancy 1991). This way, this new materialist
erotic modus operandi becomes crucially feminist as well in its urgency, by the
virtue of its attempt to deconstruct the predominant supposition of a certain human
objectivity that ultimately stems from the logic of “White Capitalist Patriarchy…
that turns everything into a resource for appropriation… in short… objectified”
(Haraway 1991, 197-198), and to acknowledge instead the perpetual “agential
intra-action” (Barad 2003; Barad 2011) that takes place among materials, humans,
and nonhumans alike.
Furthermore, this love for the material is also perceived to be potentially
decolonizing, by the virtue of an insistence it offers against the rush of contemporary
globalized capitalism, that notion of “progress [as] a forward march” (Tsing 2015,
21), in which ecologies such as the site where Michelle resolves to settle, as well
as materialities in general, are often easily neglected, disposed, and departed from,
as to pursue instead the alluring promises of the capitalist empire. However, this
decolonial intuition in Yapan’s film is not so much as the precarious “idealization
of nature, the fetishization of the past and the opposition to the ‘new’” (Salazar
2016), than an uneasy, and perhaps even awkward assertion of an alternative.
Indeed, it suggests the possibility to exist in what might simply appear as a “patch
of ruination” (Tsing 2015, 206) such as Michelle’s hut by the bamboo grove and its
immediate environ, with all the materials found here, in the present postcolonial
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Philippines, where opportunities for thriving in another, and perhaps more creative
terms are often overlooked, if not deliberately left unexplored. Certainly, through
her love for and becoming with things that surround her, “rather than let herself
be swept up toward witless complicity in notions of progress and development,
especially with reference to the global traffic of bodies and commodities in which
the Philippine state has all too readily connived, Michelle insists on fashioning
for herself a vantage from which to appraise the costs of such notions, and to
negotiate the performance of her everyday life accordingly” (Salazar 2016).1 It is
through such a loving attitude toward things that the decolonizing potential of new
materialism, albeit perhaps understated in this preliminary essay, can be intuited.
Bearing this critical possibility of loving the material, this essay considers the
encouraged gazing at the end of Yapan’s film as a viable exercise of such erotic
modus operandi. This essay wagers on the said gesture to be instructive toward
a potential reunderstanding of the sense of sight as a form of encounter with other
materialities, beyond the frequent association of vision to the objectification of
things, by simply “subjecting them to a controlling and curious gaze” (Mulvey
1989, 16). As such, sight is presently argued to be a human telepathic ability, that
is, a distant (tele) feeling (pathein) with and for things, despite and because of
their thinghoods that are knowable, if only for a moment (see Gamble, Hanan,
and Nail 2019, 122-124; Benitez 2019, 477-82). Through looking closely at the
rhetorical engagement of Yapan’s Kubo with its various viewers, particularly with
the attention of the latter to the presence of things projected on the cinematic screen,
the essay attempts to articulate from the film a preliminary speculation of critical
attention—itself an art of noticing (Tsing 2015, 17ff.)—as an anthropomorphic
cinematic practice that doubles as a loving attempt to become with the material
ecology of things.
2. “The flower is a flower”: On vitality of things
An Kubo sa Kawayanan premiered on June 25, 2015, as part of the 2nd World
Premieres Film Festival, where it was given several accolades, including the award
for the Best Picture in the Filipino New Cinema category (Garcia 2015). On its
gala night, a short question-and-answer session with the director, Alvin Yapan,
followed the film screening, during which a woman from the audience stood up
and went to the microphone, to try make sense of the film’s ending: what was the
meaning of this flower floating down the Bicol River, she asked. The woman was
1. In his director’s statement on the film, Yapan draws attention to the understated discourse on im/mobility in the
context of contemporary globalization: “The point is staying put does not necessarily mean idleness. This is important
because the supremacy of the idea of a network over the individual is sometimes misconstrued as fighting for stasis,
for the preservation of the status quo… [It] is important to show how stasis is not necessarily synonymous to idleness
and decay” (“The Hut by the Bamboo Grove” n.d.). See also Mortel, Jocson, and Natividad (2016).
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curious whether Yapan really intended to have as the punctation of the film this
flower—from the genus zinnia, the woman identified—because according to her,
it was often considered as a “symbol” of strength (which was, she further shared,
the reason why she herself has gotten a tattoo of the same flower on her forearm).2
In his response, Yapan was evidently resistant to such kind of moral symbolization
of the flower in question, and by extension, the other things featured in the film: for
him, the flower is a flower, as much as the other things projected onto the screen are
also what they materially are.3 Such articulation on the manner of revering things is
most crucial in understanding Yapan’s film, for although it might seem circuitous
a statement, it points at his critical attempt to portray these things in accordance
to their very materiality—that is, to render them as they supposedly are, instead
of their being objects, as in reduced as “symbols” for a didactic rhetoric rampant
even in the contemporary Filipino cinema and spectatorship.4 As Yapan himself
excitedly shared in a press conference prior the film’s release, in Kubo, “characters
din dito ‘yong kubo, ’yong salagubang, ’yong lata ng sardinas, bulaklak, bato…”
(“the hut, the beetle, the sardine can, the flowers, the stone are also characters
here…”) (“Filmmaker Alvin Yapan…” 2015), where character is implied to turn
to its etymological sense, as in accentuating of the distinctive quality of anything,
and thus not simply limited to anthropomorphic figurations.5 In other words, Kubo
is Yapan’s cinematic effort to “depict an ‘organic’ relationship between human
and house” (Lee 2015), in which the latter is suggested to be just as significant as
the former, since for Yapan, once more, “it is not just us human beings who has
a will; even the stone, the beetle and the can of sardines can express their will”
(“The House by the Bamboo Grove” n.d.). And so, the film is ultimately rendered
2. This association of the zinnia to strength can perhaps be attributed to the genus’s persistence throughout history;
see, for instance, Grissell’s (2020) horti/cultural historization of the plant. Taking into consideration this entanglement
of the said plant with humans throughout history, one can then intuitively imagine an existence of metonymic chain
that could breakdown the instantaneous, if not hasty equivalence of a zinnia to the virtue of strength, as to reveal such
equation to be catachretic, that is, a forced metaphorization. Most instructive in imagining such associative chain is, of
course, Derrida’s (1982, 245-457) tracing of the heliotrope or the metaphor of the sun.
3. In another recounting of the same instance: “a stone represents a stone, says Yapan during the film’s gala premiere.
Everything is what they are. Hence, the film ought to be taken as it is” (Macarayan 2015).
4. As symptomatically attested already by the woman’s instinctive appreciation of the zinnia in the aforementioned
scene. To further illustrate this didactic tendency in Philippine cinema spectatorship aside from the appraisals of Kubo
to be cited in the succeeding parts of the essay, one can turn to the reviews for the film Baconaua (2017) by Joseph
Israel Laban, whose locus is the island of Masbate. In this film, the sea as a material in its entirety performs a crucial
role in instigating the most significant turns of the diegesis. However, most readings of the film, in relation to the sea,
intuit the latter to be a symbol implied to necessitate a deciphering (see Tan 2017; Cruz 2017); or if the sea was even
considered as a character in itself, it is only to the extent that the sea is mythic (see Castillo 2020)—a critical tendency
that is shared by at least one review of Kubo (see Manaig 2015).
5. In his director’s statement, Yapan also articulates the role of things in the film as follows: “I really want to characterize
the house as an object, a thing, that is also capable of expressing its love for a woman, whatever the house’s definition
of love may be” (“The Hut by the Bamboo Grove” n.d.; emphasis mine). It is crucial to underscore Yapan’s usage of
the term characterize instead of, say, animate, whose etymological basis is that of the soul. For further significance of
this turning away from the anima for Yapan, see note 7.
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to be an exercise in “translat[ing] a story of a house—as a house” (Balante 2015;
emphasis mine), with all the other things found in such material ecology to be
performing as themselves as well (see Barad 2011).6
In Kubo, therefore, what takes place can be suggested as “a recourse to cinema
as ‘object-oriented ontology,’ where earthly matter takes precedence over human
agency” (Jacobo 2016). As how Morton (2013) defines object-oriented ontology
to be a “commit[ment] to a unique form of realism and nonanthropocentric
thinking” (2), Kubo as a supposedly “object-oriented” film offers a way to attend
to things, to carefully notice them, while also refusing the common temptation of
merely objectifying them; in other words, it is a cinema that attempts to propose
a manner of revering materials, in a way that is “not just licked by nostalgia or
sentimentality” (Dela Cruz 2015) that can precariously turn things to, say, symbols.
In this sense, to simply say that the things featured in Kubo function as “narrative
device” or a “metaphor to evoke something deeper to the viewers” (Balante 2016)
does not suffice—and indeed, must be refused—as an appraisal. Instead, what
ought to be insistently imagined is a consideration of these things to be as they are
perceived materially, if not sensually, than merely rhetorically, for the purpose of
preconceived anthropocentric valuation, as in such symbols for the most didactic
of rhetoric.
Bennett’s (2010) critical attention to what she calls “vitality” of things can be
most instructive to imagining this “object-oriented” reverence to the material in
Yapan’s film.7 For Bennett, this vitality is “intrinsic to materiality as such,” and
thus involves “detach[ing] materiality from the figures of passive, mechanistic,
or divinely infused substance. This vibrant matter is not the raw material for
the creative activity of humans or God” (xiii). Vitality then, one can say, can be
perceived on the very physicality of things: it is in the being flower itself of, say,
the zinnia, with its colorful petals, that take part in the entire process of a plant’s
persistence and propagation of itself; it is in the flower’s very lack of fragrance, and
its possibly softest of sound when brushed by another matter. Or, if such a zinnia is
6 It is interesting to quote here at length a reviewer’s remark on the performance of a beetle in the film: “This film
revels in miniaturism that a beetle is given its own narrative fiber. And as if following it slowly crawl on a window
stool is not enough, Yapan gives it its own highlight. A thread is gripping it around the pronotum, so it is not able to fly
away. Its winding through infinite loop by its chain is its dramatic cry for the curtailed freedom to flutter away, and this
momentous spotlight could earn for it a Best Cameo award, you bet” (Maburaot 2016).
7. Here, it must be noted that Yapan himself, in his director’s statement for Kubo, relates that “the inspiration for this
film came from reading Jane Bennett’s [2010] book entitled Vibrant Matter: A Political Ecology of Things. In this book,
Bennett tries to deploy an ecocriticism by developing a theory of vitality which she says takes the place of the will or
spirit, when we erase the centrality of human experience and thought in understanding phenomena. In this film, I would
like to show how the erasure of the boundaries between the human and animal, the organic and inorganic, the animate
and inanimate, is important for us to appreciate the delicate balance of the ecological network and interconnectedness
we live in” (“The Hut by the Bamboo Grove” n.d.). Therefore, if one is to take Yapan’s directorial note as an extension
of the film itself, however, not by the virtue of Yapan’s authorial precedence in making sense of the film but rather the
intertextuality of the two, it can even be construed that the film asserts itself in its own terms, in order for the things it
features to be read according to their respective materialities.
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picked, plucked away from the rest of the shrub, vitality must be in the capacity of
this flower, too, to wilt in due time, or in some other cases, to dry itself to brown
if chosen to be kept pressed between the pages of a book. Vitality must also be in
the size and lightness of the same flower, able as it is to float and be drifted by the
currents when it is thrown into the river and carried to the sea; vitality is in the
conceivable sinking as well of the zinnia, wet as it would eventually be.
Therefore, the being “symbol” of strength of the zinnia is not so much because
of its being an inherent symbol, especially since the term symbol, as Barthes
(1967) reminds us, “implied the idea of motivation” (38) that is, more often than
not, anthropocentric in its locus. And so, in the refusal to simply consider and
reduce things as symbols, it is crucial to underscore that this is not to say that such
materials lack any motivation per se; on the contrary, it is to assert the possibility
of their being motivated, too, although in forms that can only be in their own terms,
and thus, perhaps, ultimately inaccessible to human comprehension. For as how
Bennett insists that things in their vibrancy are far from being passive, mechanistic,
and divinely infused, their motivations too as materials must also mean that their
impulses cannot be necessarily determined with utmost accuracy, especially if the
method of such attempt at knowing is limited by rigid anthropocentric parameters;
at most, what can be known about these things is already an outcome of “specific
physical arrangements,” a resultant of “specific agential practices/intra-actions/
performances through which specific exclusionary boundaries are enacted” on
their materialities (Barad 2003, 814, 816). Or as Morton (2013) reminds us, in the
paradigm of object-oriented ontology, things are “objects in their own right” (2),
and thus to nominate a thing to be certainly a “symbol” that strictly corresponds to
whatever specific ideal designated to it is to outright subject it to an anthropocentric
valuation regarding its presumed motivations. This, in turn, violently divests from the
material the numerous opportunities to become anything else it could possibly be.
In the case of hailing the zinnia to be a “symbol” for strength, the danger lies
then in the likely disregard of the very materiality of the flower itself—that is,
its range of capacities to interact with other things given its being a flower—
if only to perpetuate instead the anthropocentric moralities projected onto it. In
other words, this symbolization can only precariously lead to “the erasure of the
efficacity of the sensory figure” itself (Derrida 1982, 210) that is the zinnia, as to
exclusively accommodate in its place an imposed value. It is from this danger that
one might—and indeed, must—urgently attend to the symbolism that is claimed
to happen upon the sight of the flower: what is this “strength” that the zinnia
is purportedly “symbolizing” anyway? Why can the zinnia not be taken as an
embodiment too of, say, “weakness”—or for that matter, other “virtues,” or even
“profanities”? And perhaps, even more crucial: why should the zinnia be taken
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as a “symbol” in the first place? Could the zinnia be taken instead for what it
supposedly is—a flower that participates in a particular material ecology at any
given time, in a variety of ways that might even be beyond its functions currently
known to humans, biological or otherwise? Or at the very least, a flower, indeed,
on the cinematic screen, colorful petals and all, beside and among other materials
found in a mise-en-scène?
Taking cue then from the poet Gertrude Stein’s (1922) iconic line (187), similar
to what has already been articulated by Yapan himself in response to the question
of the flower at the end of Kubo, it can be said that the zinnia in the film is a zinnia
is a zinnia is a zinnia. Such statement of identity emphasizes the materiality of the
flower, “stressing that the [zinnia] is there, but it does not really say very much”
(Fleissner 1977, 326) about anything, even about itself. It is through accentuating
such “quiet” performance of the zinnia that the temptation of hastily designating
it as a symbol can be ultimately resisted, as this renders palpable the most
indeterminate materiality of the flower. In other words, through this perceived
quietness of the zinnia, the flower is underscored to be “what exceeds” (Barthes
2013a, 87) because of its vibrant materiality, the understanding of which can only
be approximated through a language that also strives to refuse thoughtless, and
often didactic symbolisms. It is then intuited here that the attempt to decipher the
zinnia as a symbol, the desire to “really say very much” about it to comprehend
it, is not necessary after all, because to begin saying anything about the flower is
already a moment of precarity, wherein the reduction of the muchness that is the
vitality of the matter itself is always at bay. Or if anything, at the very least, such
gesture of saying something about the flower ought to simultaneously invoke other
instances of saying regarding the same matter—indeed, a semantic blossoming
that desires to approximate the phenomenon of the zinnia while most conscious of
its perpetual excessiveness in the vicinity of anthropomorphic language.
It is in the same manner that Yapan’s Kubo in its entirety can be perceived—as
a cinematic gesture that ultimately attempts to attend to the vibrant materiality
of things, and thus “a literal representation of all elements present onscreen”
(Macarayan 2015). For instance, one can hereon pause from hastily deducing that
the bamboo hut Michelle devotedly inhabits simply “represents home” (Cruz 2015;
emphasis mine), especially when such rhetoric of home is wrought with nostalgia,
as in the romance of a “perpetual search of greener pasture” (Lauzon 2015) or
“lost origins” (Manaig 2015); or deployed in unexamined terms of stasis, as in
the dangerous sentiment that “change is not necessary… marvel[ling] on the idea
that some things are left untouched and unmoved” (Balante 2015), to the point
that it becomes “a site of decay” (Manaig 2015).8 For on the contrary, the bamboo
8. For a related articulation by Yapan himself regarding stasis, see note 1.
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hut can also be perceived as moving at the same time, “unavoidably pervious [as
it is] to the currents of modernity” (Salazar 2016), “not able to evade the feelers
of globalization” (Maburaot 2015): indeed, change itself is suggested to be most
welcomed, deemed as necessary even, for the infrastructure to persist itself over
time; after all, even the wooden parts of the house have to be replaced anew every
so often, so that its entirety would not collapse into poor condition. It is only
through such permeability with other materials, even in manners that might seem
hardly noticeable to the human eye, that the hut by the bamboo grove can be.9 As
Michelle herself puts it early in the film:
Nakapirang ribay na ning kawayan para sa lanob na ini. Para sa salog na ini. Pirang beses na?
Kun ako sana kuta, mas gusto ko kutang dai na pararibay-ribay. Magastos. Pero ining harong
lugod, an gusto sanang magparasangli ning magparasangli ning na garo nagsasangli ning bado.
Bago sanang bago.
(How much bamboo has been spent on these walls. This floor. For how many changes? If it’s up
to me, I’d prefer to not change. It’s expensive. It is [the] house that likes to keep changing, with
bamboo for its clothes. Over and over.)

3. “I do not know”: On the vitality of cinema
Despite the attempt of Kubo towards an “object-oriented” discourse, the
tendency to treat the materials in the film as mere symbols still abounds. A Filipino
film reviewer points out the tension at work in beholding Kubo: bearing in mind
Yapan’s “proclivity towards more silent, mysterious approaches in telling a story,”
despite his warning to do otherwise, one cannot help but “look at a film like this
and not consider what symbolisms were used,” as if being played “into thinking
there’s more to this pile of stones consistently flashed on screen” (Balante 2015;
emphasis mine). Similarly, for another Filipino film reviewer, after considering
Kubo as “a completely arthouse type of cinema where plot is secondary to the
images it presents onscreen,” it seemingly becomes an imperative that “we have
to extract meaning from the visually lyrical poem that we just watched… [as]
that is the art in films like this” (Fred Said 2015; emphasis mine). In other words,
between the new materialist discourse Yapan attempts to advance through his film,
the cinematic mode through which the film is deliberately rendered, and the arrival

9. Most contrary then to what Bachelard (1994) imagines of “the hermit’s hut… need[ing] no variations,” and whose
“truth must derive from the intensity of its essence, which is the essence of the verb ‘to inhabit’” (32, in Manaig 2015).
By the utmost permeability of the house in Kubo, it can then be perceived to be more akin to the Philippine rendition
of the hut as bahay kubo, whose common imagination by way a Filipino folk song of the same title (see Bahay Kubo
1996) renders it to be a “structure that opens up time and space… by encompassing [even] the vegetable garden that
surrounds it” (Jacobo 2011, 67).
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of the film itself to the Filipino spectator,10 there appears to be a gap. As another
Filipino film critic astutely articulates it, an uncertainty can only be perceived
“whether the cinematic language the director has experimented with can be said to
apprehend the neo-impressionism this kind of paradigm shift [i.e., object-oriented]
must evince” (Jacobo 2016; emphasis mine).
It is crucial to note here that while these remarks on Kubo may seem understanding
or at least empathic of Yapan’s new materialist stake in his film, they also happen
to commit a form of violence, no matter how seemingly minute, to material
ecologies through the very critique they rehearse: for in their respective efforts to
write about Kubo, they also subject the film itself to common typifications, which,
in turn, violently forecloses the possibility of its cinematic materiality to their
imaginations. For instance, by nominating Kubo as “a completely arthouse type of
cinema,” or by supposing the imperative that its “object-oriented ontology” “must
evince” a certain “neo-impressionism,” the film is immediately subjected to sets of
expectations that are usually, if not hastily, associated with these cinematic modes.
This way, it can be inferred that in the particular case of Kubo, the disjuncture
perceived between the filmic discourse, its cinematic mode, and its arrival to the
audience stems as well from existent preconceived notions regarding the material
that is the cinema itself: in being hailed as an “arthouse curio” (Lee 2015), for
instance, the vitality of the film as a thing of its own is then implicitly insisted
to conform to a specific standard, a “genre-clause” (Derrida 1992, 231) that is
ultimately derived from an exterior—and of course, anthropocentric—force at
work, namely the entirety of Philippine culture industry.11
If criticism is to interfere as to make apparent the new materialist potential in
Yapan’s Kubo, a reconsideration on the vitality of cinema itself must be pursued.
In undertaking such task, an ecocritical turn in film studies, such as Ivakhiv’s
(2013) three ecologies, can be useful as a paradigm: in Ivakhiv’s case, through
10. It is important to underscore the notion of a cinematic arrival, in lieu of its reception, especially since the latter
implicitly directs the vector of the material toward what is often a solely human audience. In other words, in translating
the Marxist concern of reception as arrival, the perceived anthropocentrism in the ecology of materials as the economic
circuit is aspired to be attenuated. While this recourse to arrival is primarily owed to Lumbera’s (2000) ideation
of the Filipino dating (lit. “arrival,” “impression”), the present critical attention to the indeterminate materiality of
things is also considered through a simultaneous echoing of the Derridean notion of l’avenir, “that which is totally
unpredictable” (Derrida, Dick, and Kofman 2005, 53), related to the arrivant.
11. For instance, considering Kubo’s first screening to the 2nd World Premieres Film Festival in 2015 can align it to
“a mode of production that attended the rise of independent cinema in the country,” that is, the “practice of filmmaking
that would aspire a first screening in a festival of cinema somewhere, as long as the city hosting the event could claim
global or post-colonial pertinence” (Jacobo 2015; emphasis mine). “Independent” or “indie,” as a particular description
of the Kubo as a film (see for instance Cruz 2016; Fred Said 2015; Lee 2015; Macas 2015; “Eight Indie Pinoy Films…”
2015), only integrates it then to an entire circuit of anthropomorphic valuation, in which cinema is speciated to “resist
crass commercialism, formal aesthetic sterility, Holywood domination, and state censorship” (Campos 2016, 216).
In the case of the Philippine cinemascape, however, this quality of “independence” remains contentious, especially
since it has been commonly attributed to an aesthetic associated to the Cinemalaya Film Festival—and thus, ironically
rendering such “independence” to be still dependent after all to a most dominant mode of cinematic production in the
country (see Campos 2016; Flaviano 2017).
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looking at the material-economic, social, and perceptual ecologies in which a film
participates, cinema is ultimately deemed “[as it] has been from its outset—
intimately linked to the reproduction of capitalist social and ecological relations”
(36; see Beller 2006). However, Ivakhiv himself also admits that these linkages
are predominantly alienated from the audience: often, a film “tell[s] us little or
nothing about its own production… [or] the social relations that went into its
production” (36). And so, criticisms that simply direct themselves to these ecologies
confront the danger of disregarding altogether the filmic material in sight, as to
direct their thinking instead to the aforementioned ecologies that are frequently
anthropocentric in its discourse.12 And so, as Bennett (2010) argues, critical turns
as such often rely on the gesture of demystification that “should be used with
caution and sparingly, because demystification presumes that at the heart of any
event or process lies a human agency that has illicitly been projected into things”;
in other words, “demystification tends to screen from view the vitality of matter
and to reduce political agency to human agency” (xiv-xv).13 Therefore, if what is
aspired is a method of criticism that considers things in terms of their most vibrant
materialities, these anthropocentric inclinations must also be resisted. It then
12. This can be traced back to the most enduring dichotomy between nature and culture, in which the latter is nominated
as the site in which art as a creation, if not a product, aligns itself. Recoursing to the Filipino ideation of art as sining,
for instance, a philological pursuit of the term reveals that art as “‘thought’ is by turns cognised and embodied, [with]
the hands of the artist appear[ing] to break open the discourse of how art is transfigured by the vernacular where it
is imagined to bear the burden of a universal language” (Jacobo and Legaspi-Ramirez 2018, 104). In this sense, in
consciously treating something as an instance of art, anthropomorphic presence seems to always haunt the material, in
the precedence culturally given to the human modus that has supposedly brought such thing into being—a valuation
that constructs the art object’s aura, that “unique phenomenon of a distance, however close [the material] may be”
(Benjamin 2007, 222), since the appreciation on such thing is merely directed on its purported originary moment that
is its creation, instead of its very material presence at the moment of encounter.
Here, it is illustrative to turn again to Yapan’s directorial notes for Kubo, if only to observe by way of self-referential
pronouns an instance in which the human agency appears to primarily lead forward (as in the etymological sense of the
word produce) the process of making the film: “I am still quite excited over the idea of shooting in just one location.
This one-location shoot is necessary to capture the point of an ecological network. From afar this may be just a single
location, but in minutae we will see life teeming in its diversity. We will see the human and the non-human, the organic
and inorganic, the animate and inanimate, all living together in peaceful coexistence. And it is only man’s hubris that
leads us to think that we are alone in this world. This is what I want to capture in my film” (“The Hut by the Bamboo
Grove” n.d.; emphases mine).
Although beyond the limits of the present essay, a turn away from such anthropocentric conception of art can be
imagined through a deconstruction of the latter, as to exceed the subterranean nature-culture dichotomy at work. Most
instructive for such endeavor is Kirby’s (2011) “reading [of] Derrida’s ‘no outside of text’ and the sense of systemic
involvement to which it attests, as ‘no outside of Nature’” (x), as to ultimately propose forms of art that can also take
place without the presence of a human (artistic) agency. In other words, what can be envisioned is an understanding of
art, whose premise is that “if there is no radical or absolute boundary line between things, including between humans
and non-humans, then humans have no more monopoly over what counts as intelligence, or even scientific inquiry than
anything else does” (Gamble, Hanan, and Nail 2019, 124).
13. Interestingly, Barthes (2013) also describes “demystification” as a gesture that “penetrate[s] the object…
liberat[ing] it but… destroy[ing] it” inevitably; such method “posit[s] a reality which is entirely permeable to history,
and ideologize[s]” (274). Here, the preference for such method in Marxist thinking becomes more understandable,
not only with its conscious consideration of socio-historical conditions, but especially with its treatment to things as
primarily susceptible to fetishization as commodity (see Marx 1990, 163ff.). And so, for Barthes (2013), the critical
impetus is to balance such demystifying impulse with a tendency to poeticize, that is, to “acknowledge [the thing in]
its full weight… respect it,” which can also precariously “restore it to a state which is still mystified”; ultimately, the
most difficult task of the critic then is to seek “a reconciliation between reality and men, between description and
explanation, between object and knowledge” (274).
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becomes evident that what is necessary toward an articulation of the ecocinematic
potential in Yapan’s Kubo is a critical regard that puts into practice the film’s
proposed manner of revering things—a disposition that can only be premised on
the foremost recognition of cinema as a thing in itself too, “to be taken as it is”
(Macarayan 2015), a material that also possesses vitality, and therefore capable of
inciting events on its own, even when taken separately and autonomously from the
auteur that has supposedly created it in the first place (see Barthes 1977).
Bearing this new materialist possibility of a critique, one can then return as
to reread the aforementioned disjuncture between the avowed “object-oriented”
discourse of Kubo and the insistent impulse to “extract meaning” from materials such
as the zinnia projected on the screen: more than a failure of the film resulting from
the supposed inconsistency between its cinematic discourse and mode, or simply
an erroneous understanding of the film as fostered by a local film culture that tends
to merely see things as didactic symbols, such difference can be intuited instead
as the workings of the encounter itself between the film and the anthropomorphic
spectators, as they each perform and persist their respective materialities at the
moment. In other words, this seeming disjuncture is that “cinematic encounter
tak[ing] place… between [the spectator’s] body and the film’s body… the meeting
of two different sensoria” which, in this particular instance, appear to “not intersect”
(Marks 2000, 153), at least by the virtue of the perceived disjuncture between the
film’s purported intent vis-à-vis its arrival to the Filipino audience. Formulated
as such, it is then crucial to underscore that in this material encounter, Kubo is
far from being only passively viewed by the anthropomorphic onlooker, as it also
actively partakes in the very creation of the “understandings” of itself, however,
not because Yapan himself has provided instructions on how to make sense of the
film—for this, too, could precariously revert to the same anthropocentric valuation
of the film, with its auteur attributed precedence over the film itself14—but because
in terms of its materiality—its visuality and aurality, among others—the film also
sensorially engages with its human beholders.
It is at this point that one might be tempted to refute the presented agency of
the film thus far through a stubborn reiteration that its very construction, after all,
was made possible by its human makers. Such attribution, however, injudiciously
14. Although, it must be emphasized, Yapan’s auteurial presence in the meaning-making of his film, by way of his
directorial notes and interviews, can be easily deconstructed through the Barthesian principle of death of the author
(see Barthes 1977): if these texts are to be taken as materials as autonomous as Kubo itself, then what becomes possible
is the recognition of the film, together with these paratextual things, as an assemblage, whose heterogeneity is most
evident in the difference of the materialites gathered—a film, a written note, and instances of speech-act, among
others. It is only imaginable that such assemblage must also include the appraisals for the Kubo, despite—or precisely
because—not having been written by Yapan himself, and thus rendering the present essay to be as much part of the film
as the things captured by the camera and then projected onto the screen. This continuity between the film and the present
essay can perhaps be articulated, among other means, through a recourse to Yapan’s directorial statement that deliberately
cites Bennett’s (2010) theory, which is currently taken into consideration of the present argument; see note 7.
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reduces the materiality of the film as merely derivative of the anthropocentric
production that is presumed to be the originary agency and significance, whereas
as a thing in itself, the film is actually capable to insist itself as well, by the virtue
of its “profusion, [its] resistance to strict measures of equivalence” (Appadurai
2006, 21) that is demonstrated through its differing arrivals to various engaging
spectators. In other words, the noted range of the film’s possible “meanings” is
intuited here to be not merely an effect of the diverse anthropomorphic perceptions
of it, a demonstration indeed of the human creative prowess to generate various
meanings for its own species, but a concrete manifestation of the indeterminate
materiality itself of the film. This vitality, however, cannot be simply considered
as a “polysemic” quality of the material, since such nomination presumes that it
foremost means something (and means so in anthropocentric grammar) by this very
multiplicity. For all we know, the film, for itself, could not have meant anything,
at least in the vicinity of our most anthropomorphic understanding: the motivation
of the film could have been, for instance, to modestly light a dark room to attract
moths, or to purely fill the same room with ambient sounds; it could have also been
the process itself of making the film, without any necessity for its screenings, in
the Philippines or elsewhere.15 This way, it seems to be more appropriate to regard
this vital materiality of the film as disseminatory, in the sense that its thinghood is
always “marked out by the undecidable syntax of more” (Derrida 1981, 43), that
is, always exceeding, even of human understanding.
Through Adorno (1973), Bennett (2010) articulates this excessiveness in the
vitality of things as nonidentity, “a presence that acts upon us: we [human] knowers
are haunted… by a painful, nagging feeling that something’s being forgotten
or left out… [that] remains no matter how refined or analytically precise one’s
concepts become” (14). It is this very presence that can be, for instance, hinted in
the following statements from three different reviews of Kubo, notable for their
varying degrees of uncertainty in their respective critical engagements with the
same filmic material:
I do understand though that story is not the point of this film, but it is the symbolic meaning
of its images. We have to extract meaning from the visually lyrical poem that we just watched.
I thought of it as an allegory about Filipinos (Michelle) and the Philippines (her House)—that
we should not abandon our home country. Is that what Yapan meant to tell us? I do not know. The
true meaning is not explicitly spelled out. You give it your meaning. That is the art in films like
this. (Fred Said; emphases mine)
15. While this premise of a spectacle that resists its own exhibition might easily appear paradoxic, it is also here that
the most anthropomorphic valuation of the cinema can be revealed, bringing to the fore the dichotomy of natureculture that designates what must be expected from a particular material (see note 12). Consider, for instance, how
“the filmstrip embodies the struggle between permanence and transience[:] that whatever light is allowing us to see
the series of fixed images along the celluloid strip is causing them to fade… accelerat[ing] its inevitable destruction,”
which in itself is “only one instance of a much larger reality,” symptomatic of “the explosion of population across the
globe,” resulting to having the Earth “increasingly circumscribed and infiltrated” (MacDonald 2004, 107-108).
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Perhaps An Kubo sa Kawayanan only settles for the reminder that we live in a grander scheme,
made up of plenty of smaller things, and perhaps that’s enough. I don’t know if cinema will look
back to this small film about the smaller things. I don’t know if it will even have time for it. Also,
I don’t know if it’s caffeine intoxication, but I walk out of the cinema, moved by all the beautiful
ways. (Dela Cruz; emphases mine)
I am not sure yet whether the cinematic language the director has experimented with can be
said to apprehend the neo-impressionism this kind of paradigm shift must evince, or if such
a metaphysics of the tropical can take us to an analysis of historical modernity through a critique
of empire that has coopted even the sensorium Yapan himself protects with impunity, but yes, at
least, this spirited instance of possibilization… (Jacobo 2016; emphases mine)

In these statements, variations of the anthropomorphic admission that they “do
not know” or “are not sure yet” about the film can be read not only as a rhetorical
pretense that somehow destabilizes the argument, through a suggested refusal
to claim any objectivity or complete confidence on their persuasions; more
importantly, at least for the present aspiration toward a new materialist critique,
these statements can be understood as intimations of the nonidentity that besieges
after one experiences beholding Kubo, that haunting affect that is evoked by the
very materiality of the film itself. In other words, these admissions allow for
an articulation, no matter how seemingly understated, of the discomfort that is
often deliberately overlooked and rationalized through a hasty branding of the
film as, say, “arthouse.” And while these admissions might look like simply
surrendering to the “inevitable inssufficiency,” the “guilt” that comes with one’s
limited anthropomorphic thinking (Adorno 1973, 5), it is ironically through this
acknowledgment of human vulnerability that one can also activate “the recognition
of human participation in a shared, vital materiality… the ethical task at hand here
[being] to cultivate the ability to discern nonhuman vitality, to become perceptually
open to it” (Bennett 2010, 15). What then is such admission of anthropomorphic
insufficiency but perhaps a manifestation as well of the erotic modus operandi at
work: the revelation that “I do not know” might as well be one’s attempt to profess
their willingness, however seemingly awkward at the time, to be also permeable to
the material that is the film itself.16 In this sense, in these critiques of Kubo, love
for the material can be imagined to be, in fact, already in sight.
16. While such interpretation of the statement “I do not know” as one’s willingness to be permeable to another is
intuitively not a universally applicable or even appropriate equivalence, in the Philippine context, the possibility of
such translation can be drawn from the mechanics of a particular folk poetry: the vernacular rendition of riddle as
bugtong, the guessing of which can either culminate to the identification of the described matter, or to the admission
of one’s incapability to do so. In the case of the latter, the statement of one’s not-knowing is euphemised in the
phrase “Sirit na,” which means that the guessers have already decided to just learn from the ridder the answer for the
unsolvable bugtong. Here, it is interesting to note how the word sirit, as the moment of figuring out, is simultaneously
visual, tacticle, and auditory in its turn: sirit literally pertains to either a liquid or gaseous matter spilling out of
a narrow opening, or a whistle. And so, one can then intuit that in its Philippine rehearsal, the permeability incited
from one’s admission of not-knowing can only be most sensuous, rendering the pedagogical instance here as ultimately
subverting of the dominant precedence attributed to the head, as the locus of (Euro-Western) reason. Such turning to
the entirety of the body, as metonymized by the senses, is crucial for the present new materialist critique, as further
explicated in the succeeding part of the essay.
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4. “To lose one’s head”: On the technique of telepathy
Of dissemination, Derrida (1981) remarks that its “effect” is “to lose one’s
head, no longer to know where one’s head is”—an insight derived from his
assertion that in any given text, bearing in mind its disseminating potential, the
break “between anticipation and recapitulation” that is supposedly introduced by
the preface “appears inadmissible today” (20). While Derrida appears to playfully
deploy the idiomatic turn of “losing one’s head” in relation to the implication of
the preface or heading—as in that which arrives first of a given text, indeed its
countenance, what “put[s] before the reader’s eyes what is not yet visible” (9)—
the figure of the head, in this case, can also be also regarded in an anatomical
sense. The human head, for instance, has long taken a comparable precedence
in considering the body, valued as it is across many cultures to be the locus of
power, the condensation of one’s wholeness, and thus identity (see Janes 2005).
Meanwhile, in the case of the angiosperms under the family Asteraceae—in which
the genus zinnia belongs—the capitulum or the head that is often deemed at first
glance to be the plants’ flower is in fact their inflorescence, that is, their assemblage
of smaller flowers that only resembles a singularity; in other words, in a fleeting
look, the Asteraceae flowers themselves are missed in the relative largeness of
the capitulum—a demonstration perhaps of implicit expectations concerning floral
scale.17 Across these translations, the capitulatious “effect” that Derrida describes
is intuited to still hold true: by virtue of a material’s dissemination, it loses its head
precisely because what distinguishes and separates this part from the rest of its
body cannot be clearly delineated in the first place; in other words, its entire body
might as well be taken as its very head, as much as its head its entire body. This
way, it can also be crucially hinted here that what Derrida nominates as an “effect”
is perhaps, at the same time, a “premise,” if not a “cause.”
This disseminatory capitulation is most instructive for the urgent task of
recognizing one’s human participation in certain material ecologies at any given
moment: for similar to the effect of losing one’s head, one can propose that the
anthropomorphic agency that has been long attributed as justification for claiming
precedence over nonhuman materials is, in fact, a consequence of one’s encounters
with various materialities; in other words, the human vitality might as well be
one’s “vital entanglement” (Haraway 2008, 163) with others. In Yapan’s Kubo, for
17. Such expectation on the scale of flowers renders both the Asteraceae flowers and their capitula vulnerable to
misrecognition, with the former being unnoticed and the latter mistaken as a singular blossom. However, this precarity
is, of course, only insofar as the grammar of anatomy is concerned, whose project of identifying and demarcating
organisms’ structures and their respective fuctions create a seemingly proper language that simultaneously constitutes
the eronneous ones, as Foucault (1994) has similarly shown in other scientific discourses. In this instance, might what
Tsing (2015) calls as scalability, or the “ability… to change scales smoothly without any change in… frame” (38),
be productive perhaps in transgressing the rules of botanical language, if only to begin interrogating the presumed
objectivity of science itself—that is, to reflexively ask, for example, what separates one part of a flower from another?
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instance, Michelle’s resolve to stay in her abode can be perceived as an outcome
not only of her most insistent choice, but also as the persistence of the bamboo hut
to be a material that makes inhabiting it a viable possibility; to put it in another
way, Michelle’s agency as performed through her staying is only made feasible
with the vibrant materiality of the bamboo hut itself. Through such new materialist
consideration, the common anthropocentric appraisal of the film as embodiment
of either an “agency to transcend the forces and structures of the prevailing
social order” (Salazar 2016) or merely an “indigenous innocence” (Jacobo 2016)
is ultimately undermined, as to assert instead the simultaneity of most varying
vitalities at work. Michelle herself eventually articulates such epiphany to Larry, in
her recounting of a dream: “Nanaginip ako. Nakatingin ako sa tubig. Akala ko, ako
’yong gumagalaw… Iyong ilog ang gumagalaw para sa akin. Napakasakit natin
maunawaan… Napakahirap.” (I had a dream. I was looking at the water. I thought
I was the one moving… The river was moving for me. It’s hard to understand
that… Difficult…)
While the difficulty for such insight can be certainly rooted to a most
anthropocentric worldview that prohibits even the slightest possibility of
acknowledging nonhuman vitalities, it might as well arise from the contrary: in an
utmost but thoughtless reverence to things, one’s recognition of excessive vitality
of things can precariously turn as an unexamined belief on the impossibility of
ever reconciling with them, and thus ironically regarding them as perpetually
“inimical” (Adorno 1973, 6) and “mystified” (Barthes 2013b, 274), “withdrawn…
never chang[ing]” (Gamble, Hanan, and Nail 2019, 121). However, as Bennett
(2010) also warns us, such “acceptance of the impossibility” (14) is not so much the
critical point of new materialism, as the attempt itself to recognize intersections of
human vitalities with those of nonhumans, no matter how briefly. This recognition,
according to Bennett, can be put into practice when vital materialists are able to
“cultivate a more careful attention” to things, to “try to linger in those moments
during which they find themselves fascinated by objects, taking them as clues to
the material vitality that they share with them” (17); in other words, such crucial
recognition necessitates that one permits oneself the opportunity to be vulnerable
to things, to be permeable with their most indeterminate vitalities, indeed, despite
and because of the likelihood to be “shaken by doubt” (Butler 2002, 66) in such
encounters.
This loving doubt is crucial in the practice of careful attention, lest this gesture
precariously regresses to a hasty projection of anthropocentric valuation—if not
symbolization—of things: by keeping in mind the utmost excessiveness of any
material, what may easily appear as the vitality of a particular matter is considered
in relation to one’s limited understanding of it, as well as the potential of the same
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thing to turn into something else at any given moment. This way, in such careful
attention, the materiality encountered in one instance can only be intuited at most
to be a degree of intimation of itself, which can also be perceived differently by
another in a separate happenstance. As such, in the case of the material that is
cinema, this careful attention thus entails an acknowledgment of the said thing
as, indeed, a palabas, the Philippine rendition of “spectacle and appearance…
(dis)guise and… manifestation,” whose being “tactical” ultimately renders it to be
“also corruptive [where] semblance is always elusive” (Flores 2008, 9). However,
far from implying to be simply withdrawn from and hence impermeable to other
materials, this underscored elusiveness of the cinema only points to a most
necessary distance between things—what could be perceived as différance, that
“interval [that] must separate the present [material] from what it is not in order
for the present [material] to be itself” (Derrida 1982, 13). To put it in another
way, this interval is the space in which a thing is given time to perform its own
materiality (Benitez 2019, 480), if only to allow itself eventually to be vulnerable
as to assemble with another. And so, it can then be construed that only with and
through such interval of elusiveness could the possibility of love, with its most
erotic of modus operandi, also emerge.
In Kubo, it is by the virtue of this crucial material interval that Michelle would
also perceive difficulties every so often in making sense of her connection with
things: despite her most careful attention for them, the bamboo hut, among others,
can only encounter and be encountered in its own terms as a house. And yet, at the
same time, it is also through and against this difficult interval that Michelle and
the bamboo hut both perform the possibility of communicating with each other,
however oblique or temporal this contact might be. For her part, Michelle at least
intuits this interaction with the bamboo hut to happen through the technique of
telepathy:
May tataramon kami kan harong na kami sana nagkakasarabutan. An mga bagay sa palibot ko
ang ginagamit kaining tataramon. Minsan, pinapadarhan niya ako ning mga pangatorogan para
duman kaulayon. Pag minsan lugod, dai ko na aram kun nagtataram pa ako sa isip o gamit na
ang dila ko.
(The house and I have a language only we could understand. Its words are the things around me.
Sometimes it sends me dreams so we could talk there. When I reply, I sometimes could no longer
tell if I speak with my mind or with my tongue.)

In what Michelle asserts to be a secret language with the house, things become
imbued with urgent significance: missing shears and creaking bamboo underfoot
become proclamations from the house itself, as if urging her, like the rest of the
town, to leave. However, similar to how the zinnia can be precariously taken as
a “symbol” for strength, this telepathic line between Michelle and the bamboo hut
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is most precarious, for in the first place, to contend that a material is an envoi is
already a wager in itself, a rehearsal of one’s agency, and even more so to claim
that such message is intended to arrive for a particular anthropomorphic addressee
such as oneself. Indeed, as Derrida (2007) reminds us, for while a material “falls to
me… I choose that it should choose me by chance, I wish to cross its path, I want to
be there… [I] say ‘It was me,’ with a gentle and terrible decision” (229; emphasis
mine). It is then by willingly taking such risk that Michelle can be understandably
regarded as a madwoman by some,18 given her most daring capability “to say after
the letter [that is the material] ‘it is I,’ it was already I, that will have been I and in
the night of this wagered certainty commits her life to it without return, takes all
possible risks, keeps upping the stakes without trembling…,” meanwhile doing all
this “gently… without show and as if in silence” (230). It is, in other words, “to lose
one’s head, no more no less” (243)—however not necessarily because Michelle is
certainly a madwoman, but because the bold claiming that she performs ultimately
renders her erotic desire for “the erasure of the boundaries between the human and
animal, the organic and inorganic, the animate and inanimate” (“The House by the
Bamboo Grove” n.d.)—indeed, a disseminatory instance in which her head can be
imaginably elsewhere, or perhaps everywhere, in her surroundings.
Such precarity, for Derrida (2007), can only be the work of telepathy itself:
“telepathy against telepathy, distance against menacing immediacy, but also the
opposite, feeling… against the suffering of distance…” (259); it is then, one
can say, the insistence for a loving encounter with and through the necessary
interval one shares with another matter. Translating it to Bennett’s (2010) rhetoric,
such telepathic work can thus be described as an instance of enchantment with
things, wherein one becomes most permeable to the vitalities of others, which
is at the same time a consequence of one’s active practicing of careful attention
to these materials: telepathy is thus the recognition of the intersection of one’s
anthropomorphic agency with those of many others, ultimately premised on the
willingness as well to wager that these materials indeed perform their own vitalities
in the same ecology, no matter how seemingly imperceptible. It is to most daringly
18. For instance, Salazar’s (2016) positing of a certain Foucauldian madness (see Foucault 1961) upon Michelle,
given her deviance from “the prevailing social order”: “she evinces an intense attachment to her domicile, as well as
the customary design of her life-ways, that is revealed to border on the uncanny, suggestive of either psychological
disorder or supernatural intervention.” A worse charge would be Manaig’s (2015) blunt description of Michelle to be
in a “quasi-schizophrenic state,” whose further explication as her “speak[ing] to herself, perhaps in response to all the
decoded flows of labor, capital, and commodities that encircle her” might have been an attempt to echo Deleuze and
Guattari’s (1983) conception of schizophrenia as potential resistance against capitalism, but ultimately fails in locating
Michelle nevertheless in the idyllic discourse of “nostalgia for our nation’s [the Philippines] lost origins.” And yet,
considering how Derrida (2007) implicates telepathy to be the premise of any communicative instant—since language
itself is most prone to dissemination, and thus to claim that one “understands” another is to perform the same telepathic
daring—anyone who participates then in a communicative ecology might as well be suspected of similar madness,
which in turn would obliterate the notion of deviance upon which the notion of madness itself is premised.
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feel for these things, despite and through the necessary interval between one and
another: it is, in Michelle’s rehearsal, less of the imperfection of the language
she secretly shares with the bamboo hut, than the possibility of performing this
telepathic line repeatedly over time, if only in the hopes of making rooms for
differences every so often. As Michelle relates it to Larry at the end of the film,
“Naiintindihan ko ang sinasabi ng harong kung pipirmi ako dito… kasi masaya
ako” (I understand what the house is telling me if I want to stay… It is because
I am happy): the telepathic prospect of becoming with things, however uncertain
it may initially appear, is most imaginable and probable, only with and through
the loving choice to become vulnerable enough to attempt visualizing so.19 In
other words, in telepathy, one loses their head, no more and no less, if only to risk
toward a certain intimacy with the material ecology of things.
5. Towards telepathic technique as a cinematic practice
The technique of telepathy can be instructive in articulating the gesture of
beholding the cinema as a viable erotic modus operandi, no matter how preliminary.
For as how in Kubo, Michelle and the house, as well as the other materials present,
converse by way of telepathic interactions in their particular ecology, at the moment
of beholding a film, the spectator and the film itself can be imagined to partake
in a similar telepathic instance, one that can be imagined to take place in the very
act of looking. In such a moment of looking, a wager simultaneously unfolds, one
that aspires for an encounter to happen—say, that the human may dare claim to
understand the film, however incompletely; and, at the same time, that the film
may somehow insist itself upon the human, however briefly. In other words, sight,
especially in the practice of a most careful attention, becomes a sense that rehearses
the loving attempt to cross the persistent and necessary interval among materials—
indeed, a form of “feeling” that can only be aspired to be “against the suffering of
distance.” Certainly, as Marks (2000) has similarly suggested, “vision itself can
be tactile, as though one were touching a film with one’s eyes”—what she calls
a haptic visuality (xi; emphasis mine). In the case of telepathic vision, however,
it is crucial to underscore that such haptic opportunity in looking is precariously
asserted to happen indeed—that is, that vision is tactile, that one does touch the
film with one’s eyes—by the virtue of the new materialist propensity that can only
19. It is in this consciousness regarding the part that one’s anthropomorphic agency plays in forming encounters
with the material ecology of things that the practice of telepathy also becomes crucially ethical. In Mathews’s (2003)
reading of the biblical myth of the Garden of Eden as instructive to what she calls as panpsychist practice, she points
out that “our new capacities for self-direction and self-concealment give rise to possibilities of choice on the one hand,
and deceit and dissemblance on the other, and hence to a range of moral behaviors that were impossible within the
state of un(self)consciousness. In this sense, selfconsciousness is associated with a ‘knowledge of good and evil’” (95).
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allow even the sense of touch itself to be permeated by other understandings, such
as becoming the very gesture of looking.20
And yet, as Haraway (1991) also reminds us, “vision is always a question of
power to see—and perhaps of the violence implicit in our visualizing practices”
(192). A version of such violence is demonstrated in the above symbolizations
of the zinnia as well as the Kubo in its entirety: the impulse for immediately
“interpreting” these materials reduces their otherwise excessive vitality into an
imposed set of moral codes that is commonly left unexamined, and thus ultimately
objectifying them as media for such anthropocentric valuations. In other words, it is
the scopophiliac tendency in looking, in which the thing beheld becomes subjected
to a most brutal gaze, which values it as merely “an object of… stimulation” or
“identification,” and thus effectually diminishing material vitality to be always
“attached to an [anthropocentric] idealisation” (Mulvey 1989, 18). However, such
precarity in our visualizing practices must be resisted to be perceived as an excuse
compelling enough to completely withdraw from their telepathic potential that
could offer us a more intimate relation with the material world at large. In fact, the
loving promise of vision might even lie in its very possibility “to make trouble,
to stir up potent response to devastating events,” as to perhaps ironically “settle
troubled waters and rebuild quiet places” (Haraway 2016, 1)—to simply put it,
in the vision’s possibility to critique. Indeed, it is by this critical opportunity that
the said instance of symbolizations of things could be looked at once again and
troubled, if only to let emerge from the event another understanding: here, it can
be proposed that the encounter between the human spectator and the cinematic
things has, in fact, not (yet) taken place, not only because the zinnia, among other
things, is amiss over the imposition of anthropocentric ideals, but also because the
humans are rhetorically transfigured to be “a blank page for social inscriptions”
(Haraway 1991, 197), impermeable as they have become with their singular
concern for anticipated and preconceived symbolisms. This way, it can be deduced
that the violence of vision in such method of dully “interpreting” the cinema does
not only occur in the objectification of vibrant matters, but as well as the reduction
of the anthropomorphic possibility into a mere medium for hegemonic ideations;
for the human, in other words, it is to lose one’s head, indeed, to the rule of White
Capitalist Patriarchy.
Haraway (1991) reverberates then Bennett’s call for careful attention to the
vitality of materials in her emphasis on the criticality of taking into account the
20. Contrary then to Ivakhiv’s (2013) assertion that while “film objects… are more than mere objects,” being potential
“carriers of affect, mediators of relations that both pass on an energetic quality or charge between humans and things
and represent that quality itself,” the material that is the film “remains an audiovisual medium, not one that can
directly transfer the movement of air on skin” (124). The crucial difference then between Ivakhiv’s formulation of the
ecocinema and the present new materialist engagement with the cinema is in the insistence of the latter to consider as
well other forms of perception, in which touch can be translated in terms of sight.
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positionality of one’s vision, as this crucially “implies responsibility for our
enabling practices” (193). For Haraway, “location is about vulnerability [as]
location resists the politics of closure”: through recognition of one’s situatedness,
the knowledge production that simultaneously takes place at any given moment
of looking is reoriented, from its presumed objectivity and autonomy imagined
after the illusion of anthropocentrism, and toward its being a conscious and
humble participation in the “process of ongoing critical interpretation among
‘fields’ of interpreters and decoders” (196). In other words, through an admission
of one’s location—of one’s emplacement in their body, with the latter’s utmost
permeability to material ecologies—vision becomes an acknowledgment as
well of one’s necessary interval from the materials in sight, that, in turn, would
allow the telepathic work of attempting to relate to them in various manners. As
such, recognition then of one’s positionality in the gesture of looking is an ironic
attempt on reclaiming one’s head from the anthropocentric hegemony, with its
White Capitalist Patriarchic grammar, as it is intuited to be a reclamation that
necessitates at the same time one’s head to be lost among the material ecology of
things: it is to ultimately enable oneself to be sensorially moved, which is a form,
too, of engaging with these materials in the critical task of discourse.
Intuitively, this recognition of one’s positionality provides the opportunity to
underscore the critical intersections that are also necessary to be considered in
any given discourse—for instance, the urgency to perform the task of decentering
anthropomorphic precedence in simultaneously decolonizing terms, which is
especially urgent for a critic who hails from the Philippines, a site that has been
repeatedly subjected to colonial duress. In such consideration, it is only crucial
to imagine the possibility of articulating these intersections not only in relation
to specific anthropomorphic populations, but also to the material ecologies
that are intimately entangled with them. In the case of Kubo, the aspiration for
a decolonizing gesture can be initiated from, say, carefully attending to the
presence of the bamboo in the film, to recognize it beyond its being commonly
“valorized, quixotically so [as] the matrix of our [the Philippine] folklore, of our
creation myths, from which our first man and woman emerged” (Manaig 2015),
and to realize that far from being simply archetypal, if not symbolic, bamboos
in the country are, in reality, most diverse, with over 60 known species, each
of them with their own characteristic materialities (see Roxas 2012). It is from
here that one can see the specific ecologies in which the bamboo, in its variety,
participates—ecologies that cannot be easily assimilated to the binaries of within
and without the global capitalist circuitry (see Tsing 2015, 61ff.), and by extension,
the categories of modern and anti-modern, if not the primitive (see, for instance,
Balante 2015; Lauzon 2015; Manaig 2015). In the same vein, Michelle’s intimacy
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with the bamboo hut and the rest of the environ can be thus perceived differently—
not as a simple echoing of the presumed habitus of the babaylan or the Philippine
shaman who is often figured as “a reference to the [Philippine] past,” the “nation’s
lost origins” (Manaig 2015), but, indeed, an alternative practice that is just as
“modern.” As Yapan himself says of the film, “there is no magic here, just the
intervention of things” (“The House by the Bamboo Grove” n.d.)—an intervention
that, of course, partakes in the ecology that is contemporary globality at large.
And so, from a practice of vision that is located on one’s anthropomorphic
vitality, the work of telepathy can then imaginably take place, wherein one’s material
interval from other things is still pronounced and ultimately acknowledged, if only
to allow oneself the opportunity to perform a loving insistence toward a material
encounter with these things. In such encounters, one might say to these things
that “I do not know,” but at the very least, through this utterance of perceptible
vulnerability, discourse itself can unfold, and possibly again. It is through such
discursive rehearsal, especially if performed most considerately in relation to
nonhuman materialities, that the human audience can embody a certain form of
careful attention that makes of a vital materialist. What becomes possible, therefore,
is a new materialist technique of looking: not simply the solitary beholding of
cinema in each of our material intervals, but the loving attempt towards encounter,
however obliquely or temporarily, with the material ecology of things. Perhaps,
it is here that one can even say such erotic modus operandi of looking could
potentially also involve practices that are commonly deemed extraneous to the
act of watching itself—say, minding one’s waste, or as a Filipino film review
proposes, “follow[ing] the poet Rilke’s dictum: ‘You must change your life!’”
(Garcia 2015; see Rilke 1995, 67-68).21 As such, when another Filipino reviewer
relates that he did not know “if it’s caffeine intoxication, but [he] walk[ed] out of
the cinema, moved by all the beautiful ways” (Dela Cruz 2015), it can be surmised
that what he describes is, indeed, an instance of telepathy with the cinema—an
encounter that can be imagined to extend even well beyond the particular moment
of watching it.
21. Similar to the proposition made by Lav Diaz, another Filipino filmmaker, known for his unusually lengthy cinema:
for him, “the filmmaker shouldn’t struggle by himself… the viewer must struggle with me,” and thus inviting the
spectators to “experience this thing [that is the cinema] together and be immersed in this universe.” It even implies
yielding to “the demands of the body, [one’s] need to defecate and urinate” in the middle of watching (“Lav Diaz,
Filipino maestro” 2016). As such, Diaz says that he “[doesn’t] believe in the concept that you have to sit in the cinema
for two hours and watch a story… Cinema can be anything… My films are not purposely done for the cinema anymore.
You can watch them there, or in the streets, or… on a plane!” (Baumgärtel 2012, 175). However, such manner of
looking can be intuited as a consequence of the length of Diaz’s films, than a new materialist engagement: the deviating
gestures that Diaz implicates in watching his film are more oriented to attend to anthropomorphic needs given the
duration of his cinema, than a loving attempt to encounter materialities. For further implications of temporality in
Diaz’s film, particularly his eight-hour long Hele Sa Hiwagang Hapis (A Lullaby to the Sorrowful Mystery, 2016), see
Benitez (2018).
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As for Kubo, this proposed telepathic encounter between the film itself and
the anthropomorphic spectator becomes an opportunity as well for the former to
persist in its own vitality. For one, it can simply be considered: are these forms
of “anthropomorphic” discourse—criticisms, question-and-answer sessions, and
even plain word-of-mouth, among others—not also viable material extensions of
the film? Are these “anthropomorphic” encounters not outcomes, too, of the film’s
very vitality, without the crucial presence of which these aforementioned discursive
events were not to happen in the first place? And in the same vein, it can also be
asked: is this very essay not a part as well of the same house in the bamboo grove
shown in the film, whose vitality is most protracted by Yapan’s cinematic feature
itself? Are these words—supposedly initially mine—not actually a telepathic
relay, making you, reader, see the film, too, however faintly—indeed, a relay from
the Philippine tropics where I have written this, all the way to where you are? To
put it in another way, are we not all simply connected now telepathically in this
material ecology of things, through and against our distances? It is here that the
punctuation of Yapan’s Kubo can be imaginably extended: the flower floating on
the Bicol River eventually drifting to the sea has now also reached wherever you
might be.22 Instead of breaking down here, at the very last instant of this essay, the
metonymic chains that could explicate these implicit ecological connections, one
can take risk and simply pass it all over in silence; this, in itself, is also a moment
of telepathy—that one could perhaps already somehow understand.
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22. With such outward movement of the flower—that is, from a locale and toward the world at large— Yapan’s Kubo
can then be perceived to ironically allude to the national hero Rizal’s (1976) poem “A las flores de Heidelberg” (“To
the flowers of Heidelberg”), in which the persona, currently in diaspora, speaks to the flowers, asking them to “carry…
/ my love to my loved ones, / peace to my country and its fecund loam, / faith to its men and virtue to its women, /
health to the gracious beings / that dwell within the sacred paternal home” (“llevad… / amor a mis amores, / paz a mi
país y a su fecunda tierra, / fe a sus hombres, virtud a sus mujeres; / salud a dulces séres / que el paternal, sagrado hogar
encierra…!”) (126-127). In the case of Kubo, however, the direction of Rizal’s flower has been crucially reversed, and
thus effectively refuting the common appraisals of the film to be a blunt ode to home, indeed, a search for the nation’s
“lost origins.”
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